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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3409 
 ___________ 
 
 EDWARD J. FERNANDEZ, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
ROSE TRUCKING and WHITE ROSE FOODS 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-04915) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 9, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 26, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
 In September 2009, Edward J. Fernandez filed a Title VII employment 
discrimination complaint, which he later amended, in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey.  He alleged that the defendants, Rose Trucking and White 
Rose Foods, “fire[d] [him] because of injuries . . . sustained while under [their] 
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employment.”  The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint, based on 
Fernandez’s concession that he had not filed a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  See Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“Before bringing suit under Title VII in federal court, a plaintiff must first file 
a charge with the EEOC.”).  Fernandez appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s order is plenary.  See Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 A plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must 
exhaust his administrative remedies by complying with the procedural requirements set 
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.  Those requirements include filing a complaint with the 
EEOC or its state equivalent within 300 days of the alleged violation.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(1).  Failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect the District 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however.  Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 
(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Hornsby v. U.S. Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986)).  
Rather, failure to exhaust in Title VII cases, which is akin to failing to comply with a 
statute of limitations, is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant.  
Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997).  Nevertheless, we have 
recognized that sua sponte dismissal may be appropriate where the plaintiff concedes that 
he failed to exhaust.  Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Fernandez made such a concession here.  In his amended complaint, Fernandez 
clearly indicated that he did not file an administrative charge prior to bringing suit in 
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federal court.  Specifically, Fernandez stated that “when I became aware that I could 
proce[e]d with the EEOC, I was told by that office that the time limit . . . had expire[d].  
The lack of knowledge in the detailed steps made me ignorant to the fact that I could 
obtain a right to sue letter.”  He also admitted, “I was not aware that I could contact the 
N.J. Division on Civil Rights in this matter.”  Nowhere has Fernandez claimed that he 
pursued his administrative remedies with the EEOC or that he is entitled to equitable 
tolling.  See Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1021 (stating that “in Title VII cases courts are 
permitted in certain limited circumstances to equitably toll filing requirements, even if 
there has been a complete failure to file . . . .”).  Therefore, under these limited 
circumstances, we conclude that the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Fernandez’s 
complaint for failure to exhaust was proper.   
 For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
 
